Τρίτη 31 Ιανουαρίου 2012

"Ημέρα Οργής" στη Συρία για το λουτρό αίματος

Τα βίαια επεισόδια στη Συρία στοίχισαν τη ζωή τουλάχιστον 100 ανθρώπων τη Δευτέρα, εκ των οποίων 54 άμαχοι, από τα πυρά των δυνάμεων ασφαλείας, στην πλειοψηφία τους στην περιοχή της Χομς της κεντρικής Συρίας, σύμφωνα με το Συριακό Παρατηρητήριο Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων.

Πενήντα πέντε πολίτες σκοτώθηκαν, εκ των οποίων οι 40 στη Χομς και την περιφέρειά της, εννέα στη Ντεράα (νότια), πέντε στα προάστια της Δαμασκού και ένας στην Ιντλέμπ (βορειοδυτικά). Επίσης δέκα λιποτάκτες του συριακού στρατού, έξι μέλη των δυνάμεων ασφαλείας και 25 στρατιώτες του τακτικού στρατού έχασαν τη ζωή τους.

Τα πτώματα μιας εξαμελούς οικογένειας - ο πατέρας, η μητέρα και τα τέσσερα παιδιά που σκοτώθηκαν την Πέμπτη - βρέθηκαν στην τοποθεσία Καρμ αλ-Ζεϊτούν, κοντά στη Χομς, προσθέτει το Παρατηρητήριο.

Ο σύρος υπουργός Εξωτερικών δήλωσε ότι η Συρία "θα συνεχίσει να αμύνεται απέναντι στην τρομοκρατία" και κατηγόρησε τις ΗΠΑ και τις χώρες της Δύσης ότι θέλουν να σπείρουν "το χάος".

"Ημέρα Οργής"

Η σημαντικότερη οργάνωση της αντιπολίτευσης στη Συρία, το Εθνικό Συριακό Συμβούλιο, κήρυξε τη σημερινή ημέρα "Ημέρα Οργής", κατηγορώντας τις δυνάμεις του καθεστώτος ότι εντείνουν την καταστολή, διαπράττοντας "σφαγές" εναντίον πολιτών.

Σε ανακοίνωσή του, το Συμβούλιο καταγγέλλει την έλλειψη "άμεσων μέτρων" από την πλευρά της διεθνούς κοινότητας "για την προστασία των πολιτών με κάθε διαθέσιμο μέσο" και υποστηρίζει πως το καθεστώς του Μπασάρ αλ-Άσαντ "εκμεταλλεύεται τις διεθνείς διαφωνίες για να εντείνει την καταστολή".

"Το καθεστώς πραγματοποιεί μια εκστρατεία σφαγών και τρομοκρατίας, που στοίχισε χθες τη ζωή σε εκατό ανθρώπους, ανάμεσά τους γυναίκες και παιδιά... στην Χομς, χρησιμοποιώντας άρματα μάχης και βαρέα όπλα για να βομβαρδίσει συνοικίες", επισημαίνει η οργάνωση.

Το Εθνικό Συριακό Συμβούλιο συντονίζει τη δράση του με άλλες οργανώσεις και κήρυξε "ημέρα πένθους και οργής σε όλη τη χώρα στη μνήμη των θυμάτων των άγριων σφαγών".

Επίσης επισήμανε "την αποφασιστικότητα του λαού να πολεμήσει για την ελευθερία και την αξιοπρέπειά του", υπογραμμίζοντας πως "δεν θα απαρνηθεί την επανάστασή του όποιες και αν είναι οι θυσίες".

"Το καθεστώς εκμεταλλεύεται την κάλυψη που του προσφέρουν ορισμένοι, σε τοπικό και διεθνές επίπεδο, για να εντείνει την καταστολή, καταλήγει το Συμβούλιο, αναφερόμενο στο Ιράν και τη Ρωσία.

Κινητικότητα στο ΣΑ του ΟΗΕ

Παράλληλα οι υπουργοί Εξωτερικών των ΗΠΑ και αρκετών ευρωπαϊκών χωρών συνεδριάζουν την Τρίτη στο Συμβούλιο Ασφαλείας του ΟΗΕ για να στηρίξουν το αραβικό ειρηνευτικό σχέδιο για τη Συρία, παρά τη διαφωνία της Ρωσίας.

Η Αμερικανίδα Χίλαρι Κλίντον, ο Γάλλος Αλέν Ζιπέ και ο Βρετανός Ουίλιαμ Χέιγκ θα ζητήσουν το Συμβούλιο να βγει από μια αδράνεια δέκα μηνών και να υιοθετήσει απόφαση που καταγγέλλει την καταστολή στη Συρία (5.400 νεκροί από το Μάρτιο του 2011, σύμφωνα με τον ΟΗΕ) και ζητεί μια δημοκρατική μετάβαση στη Δαμασκό.

Οι ηγέτες της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης στη χθεσινή σύνοδο κορυφής στις Βρυξέλλες ζήτησαν από τον ΟΗΕ να "λάβει τα αναγκαία μέτρα για να τερματιστεί η καταστολή".

Η Ρωσία και η Κίνα είχαν ασκήσει το δικαίωμα αρνησικυρίας τους τον Οκτώβριο του 2011 σε ένα προγενέστερο κείμενο των χωρών της Δύσης. Το νέο κείμενο που βασίζεται στο σχέδιο διευθέτησης του Αραβικού Συνδέσμου δεν εγκρίνεται από τη Ρωσία, κυρίως γιατί προβλέπει την εκχώρηση της εξουσίας από τον πρόεδρο Μπασάρ αλ-Ασαντ. Κατά τον ρώσο υφυπουργό Εξωτερικών Γκενάντι Γκατίλοφ πρόκειται για "ανάμειξη στις συριακές υποθέσεις".

Ωστόσο, η κατάσταση έχει επιδεινωθεί. "Το καθεστώς ενισχύει την όλο και πιο αιματηρή καταστολή", λένε δυτικοί διπλωμάτες.

Η αμερικανίδα πρεσβευτής στον ΟΗΕ Σούζαν Ράις είπε ότι "βρισκόμαστε σε ένα κρίσιμο σημείο και είναι ζωτικής σημασίας το Συμβούλιο να υιοθετήσει τη διαδικασία που ξεκίνησε ο Αραβικός Σύνδεσμος". Η διαπραγμάτευση, διευκρίνισε, θα συνεχιστεί ύστερα από μια σύντομη υπουργική επίσκεψη που δεν βρίσκονται εδώ για να διαπραγματευτούν το κείμενο αλλά για να ασκήσουν πιέσεις.

Οι εμπειρογνώμονες των 15 χωρών άρχισαν να εξετάζουν το κείμενο αυτό το Σαββατοκύριακο. Οι συνομιλίες αυτές είναι "δύσκολες και μακρές", αναφέρει η γαλλική αντιπροσωπεία στη διεύθυνσή της στο Twitter.

Ο υπουργός Ευρωπαϊκών Υποθέσεων Μίχαελ Λινκ θα εκπροσωπήσει τη Γερμανία, που προωθεί το σχέδιο αυτό στη σύνοδο. Αντίθετα ο επικεφαλής της ρωσικής διπλωματίας Σεργκέι Λαβρόφ δεν θα μεταβεί στη Νέα Υόρκη.

Η συνεδρίαση θα αρχίσει την Τρίτη στις 15:00 τοπική ώρα (22:00 ώρα Ελλάδος) με μια έκθεση του γενικού γραμματέα του Αραβικού Συνδέσμου Νάμπιλ αλ-Αράμπι και του πρωθυπουργού του Κατάρ σεΐχη Χαμάντ μπεν Γιάσεμ αλ-Θάνι και θα διαρκέσει περίπου τρεις ώρες.

Η Ρωσία πρότεινε να φιλοξενήσει στη Μόσχα άτυπες συνομιλίες μεταξύ της συριακής κυβέρνησης και της αντιπολίτευσης. Ωστόσο ο πρόεδρος του Συριακού Εθνικού Συμβουλίου Μπουρχάν Γκαλιούν, έθεσε ως απαραίτητη προϋπόθεση για κάθε διαπραγμάτευση την αποχώρηση του προέδρου Μπασάρ αλ-Άσαντ.

http://www.nooz.gr/world/loutro-aimatos-sti-suria-me-8imata-amaxous

Δευτέρα 30 Ιανουαρίου 2012

Report identifies Hashim Thaci as 'big fish' in organised crime


Kosovo's prime minister accused of criminal connections in secret Nato documents leaked to the Guardian

Kosovo's prime minister, Hashim Thaçi, has been identified as one of the "biggest fish" in organised crime in his country, according to western military intelligence reports leaked to the Guardian.

The Nato documents, which are marked "Secret", indicate that the US and other western powers backing Kosovo's government have had extensive knowledge of its criminal connections for several years.

They also identify another senior ruling politician in Kosovo as having links to the Albanian mafia, stating that he exerts considerable control over Thaçi, a former guerrilla leader.

Marked "USA KFOR", they provide detailed information about organised criminal networks in Kosovo based on reports by western intelligence agencies and informants. The geographical spread of Kosovo's criminal gangs is set out, alongside details of alleged familial and business links.

The Council of Europe is tomorrow expected to formally demand an investigation into claims that Thaçi was the head of a "mafia-like" network responsible for smuggling weapons, drugs and human organs during and after the 1998-99 Kosovo war.

The organ trafficking allegations were contained in an official inquiry published last month by the human rights rapporteur Dick Marty.

His report accused Thaçi and several other senior figures who operated in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) of links to organised crime, prompting a major diplomatic crisis when it was leaked to the Guardian last month.

The report also named Thaçi as having exerted "violent control" over the heroin trade, and appeared to confirm concerns that after the conflict with Serbia ended, his inner circle oversaw a gang that murdered Serb captives to sell their kidneys on the black market.

The Council's of Europe's parliamentary assembly in Strasbourg will debate Marty's findings and vote on a resolution calling for criminal investigations. The vote is widely expected to be passed.

Kosovo functioned as a UN protectorate from the end of the Kosovo war until 2008, when it formally declared independence from Serbia.

Thaçi, who was re-elected prime minister last month, has been strongly backed by Nato powers. His government has dismissed the Marty report as part of a Serbian and Russian conspiracy to destabilise the fledgling state.

However, the latest leaked documents were produced by KFOR, the Nato-led peacekeeping force responsible for security in Kosovo. It was KFOR military forces that intervened in the Kosovo war in 1999, helping to put an end to a campaign of ethnic cleansing by Slobodan Milosevic's Serbian forces.

Nato said in a statement tonight that it had instigated an "internal investigation" into the leaked documents, which are intelligence assessments produced around 2004, shortly before tensions with ethnic Serbs fuelled riots in Kosovo.

In the documents, Thaçi is identified as one of a triumvirate of "biggest fish" in organised criminal circles. So too is Xhavit Haliti, a former head of logistics for the KLA who is now a close ally of the prime minister and a senior parliamentarian in his ruling PDK party. Haliti is expected to be among Kosovo's official delegation to Strasbourg tomorrow and has played a leading role in seeking to undermine the Marty report in public.

However, the Nato intelligence reports suggest that behind his role as a prominent politician, Haliti is also a senior organised criminal who carries a Czech 9mm pistol and holds considerable sway over the prime minister.

Describing him as "the power behind Hashim Thaçi", one report states that Haliti has strong ties with the Albanian mafia and Kosovo's secret service, known as KShiK. It suggests that Haliti "more or less ran" a fund for the Kosovo war in the late 1990s, profiting from the fund personally before the money dried up. "As a result, Haliti turned to organised crime on a grand scale," the reports state.

They state that he is "highly involved in prostitution, weapons and drugs smuggling" and used a hotel in the capital, Pristina, as an operational base. Haliti also serves as a political and financial adviser to the prime minister but, according to the documents, is arguably "the real boss" in the relationship. Haliti uses a fake passport to travel abroad because he is black-listed in several countries, including the US, one report states.

Haliti is linked to the alleged intimidation of political opponents in Kosovo and two suspected murders dating back to the late 1990s, when KLA infighting is said to have resulted in numerous killings.

One was a political adversary who was found "dead by the Kosovo border", apparently following a dispute with Haliti. A description of the other suspected murder – of a young journalist in Tirana, the Albanian capital – also contains a reference to the prime minister by name, but does not ascribe blame.

Citing US and Nato intelligence, the entry states Haliti is "linked" the grisly murder, going on to state: "Ali Uka, a reporter in Tirana, who supported the independence movement but criticised it in print. Uka was brutally disfigured with a bottle and screwdriver in 1997. His roommate at the time was Hashim Thaçi."

Haliti is also named in the report by Marty, which is understood to have drawn on Nato intelligence assessments along with reports from the FBI and MI5.

Marty's report includes Haliti among a list of close allies of Thaçi said to have ordered – and in some cases personally overseen – "assassinations, detentions, beatings and interrogations" during and immediately after the war.

Haliti was unavailable for comment. However, in an interview with the media outlet Balkan Insight last week he dismissed the Marty report as "political" and designed to "discredit the KLA". "I was not surprised by the report. I have followed this issue for years and the content of the report is political," he said.

But he accepted that the Council of Europe was likely to pass a resolution triggering investigations by the EU-backed justice mission in the country, known as EULEX.

"I think it's a competent investigating body," he said, "It's a European investigation body. I think that there is no possibility that EULEX investigation unit to be affected by Kosovo or Albanian politics."

Responding to the allegations in the NATO intelligence reports tonight, a Kosovo government spokesman said: "These are allegations that have circulated for over a decade, most recently recycled in the Dick Marty report. They are based on hearsay and intentional false Serbian intelligence.

"Nevertheless, the prime minister has called for an investigation by EULEX and has repeatedly pledged his full cooperation to law enforcement authorities on these scandalous and slanderous allegations.

"The government of Kosovo continues to support the strengthening of the rule of law in Kosovo, and we look forward to the cooperation of our international partners in ensuring that criminality has no place in Kosovo's development."

Road to Strasbourg

It has taken more than two years for an inquiry into organ trafficking in Kosovo to reach the Palace of Europe, a grand building in Strasbourg that serves as the headquarters of the Council of Europe.

The formal inquiry into organ trafficking in Kosovo was prompted by revelations by the former chief war crimes prosecutor at The Hague, Carla Del Ponte, who said she had been prevented from properly investigating alleged atrocities committed by the Kosovo Liberation Army.

Her most shocking disclosure – unconfirmed reports the KLA killed captives for their organs – prompted the formal inquiry by human rights rapporteur Dick Marty.

His report, published last month, suggested there was evidence that KLA commanders smuggled captives across the border into Kosovo and harvested the organs of a "handful" of Serbs.

His findings, which will be subject to a parliamentary assembly vote tomorrow, went further, accusing Kosovo's prime minister and several other senior figures of involvement in organised crime over the last decade.

guardian.co.uk, Monday 24 January 2011 18.34 गमत

Οι παραπάνω αποκαλύψεις δεν αποτελούν έκπληξη παρά χρονική επιβεβαίωση της μεθόδευσης που επιτελείται στα Βαλκάνια και ιδιαίτερα στην Πρώην Γιουγκοσλαβία τα χρόνια μετά τη διάλυσή της. Οι σχέσεις του οργανωμένου εγκλήματος με την πολιτική και κάθε άλλη μορφή εξουσίας είναι άρρηκτες. Χαρακτηρίζονται δε από σύμπνοια όσον αφορά στην επίτευξη κοινού στόχου που έχει να κάνει κυρίως με την οικονομική και πολιτική ενδυνάμωση. Δεν γνωρίζει σύνορα ούτε εθνικιστικά εμπόδια. Πολλά περισσότερα δε, αναμένεται να αποκαλύπτονται μελλοντικά για τη σκοτεινή περίοδο των ένοπλων συγκρούσεων στα Βαλκάνια τη δεκαετία του 90 και την εμπλοκή ξένων παραγόντων.

Karadzic Wants Greek President Questioned

Accused asks for subpoena to get Karolos Papoulias to disclose "relevant and necessary" information.

By Rachel Irwin - International Justice - ICTY
TRI Issue 726,
27 Jan 12

Former Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadzic this week asked judges to subpoena the current president of Greece so he can be interviewed by the accused’s defence team.

In the written request filed on January 26, Karadzic asserts that he met Karolos Papoulias, Greece’s president since 2005 and its foreign minister during most of the Bosnian war, ten days after a mortar attack on Sarajevo’s Markale market on February 5, 1994. The attack killed more than 60 people and injured over 100.

During his trial, Karadzic has repeatedly claimed that this attack was staged by the Bosnian government itself, and that bodies found at the scene were “dummies and old corpses”. He is challenging previous tribunal findings that the mortar shell was fired from Bosnian Serb-controlled territory.

In the request, Karadzic argues that he met with Papoulias on February 15, 1994, he informed him that “the Bosnian Serbs had not been responsible for the shell that landed on Markale market”.

In the same meeting, Karadzic said that he told the then Greek foreign minister that “the Serbs were ready to place some of their heavy weapons under UN control”.

The accused goes on to outline several other discussions he had with Papoulias during the course of the war, among other things concerning UN personnel who were taken hostage in 1995, and Karadzic’s desire for a “peace process”.

“There is ample reason to believe that President Papoulias has information which is relevant and necessary to Dr. Karadzic’s defence against charges that he was responsible for the Markale-1 shelling, that he was part of joint criminal enterprise against Muslims in 1994 and 1995, and that he was responsible for ‘hostage taking’ of UN personnel in May 1995,” the request states.

“Markale-1” refers to the February 1994 attack; a second mortar bombardment hit the same location in August 2005.

In previous communications between the Karadzic defence team and the government of Greece, President Papoulias has indicated that “he has no intention to satisfy the request of Dr. Karadzic” for an interview. The accused argues that a subpoena is therefore necessary.

Karadzic was arrested in July 2008 after 13 years on the run. Witness testimony in his trial, which is still ongoing, began in April 2010. The accused is representing himself in the courtroom.

http://iwpr.net/report-news/karadzic-wants-greek-president-questioned

Κυριακή 29 Ιανουαρίου 2012

Η Αυτοδιάθεση του Κοσόβου

Λίγα χρόνια μετά την έκδοση του ψηφίσματος 1244 του Συμβουλίου Ασφαλείας του ΟΗΕ, την επέμβαση του ΝΑΤΟ και ιδιαίτερα μετά τη μονομερή ανακήρυξη της ανεξαρτησίας του Κοσόβου, εμφανίστηκε ένα κίνημα που προήγαγε τη λεγόμενη «αυτοδιάθεση» με την έννοια της επιλογής για το πόσο ο λαός του Κοσόβου έχει το δικαίωμα να ζήσει στη δική του χώρα.

Δεν θα μπορούσε να έχει καλύτερο όνομα από αυτό της έννοιας που εξυπηρετεί. Και δεν θα μπορούσε να έχει καλύτερο καθοδηγητή από έναν νεαρό φοιτητή, τον Αλμπίν Κούρτι, ο οποίος και ξεκίνησε με γκράφιτι στους τοίχους της Πρίστινας και των άλλων πόλεων γράφοντας «Vetëvendosje» (Αυτοδιάθεση στα αλβανικά).

Πέτυχε να αγγίξει το νέο κόσμο, άνεργοι οι περισσότεροι που αναζητούσαν κάποια ανατρεπτική ιδεολογία να τους αναπτερώσει το ηθικό και να συνεχίζουν να τρέφουν ελπίδες για ένα μελλοντικό «ανεξάρτητο και αυτόνομο» Κόσοβο. Οι διαδηλώσεις και όποια άλλη εκδήλωση του κινήματος αποτελούσε τροφή για τα τοπικά ΜΜΕ και ενίσχυε τη φήμη και δύναμη επιρροής του.

Ο Κούρτι διακήρυττε ότι δεν υποστηρίζει μόνο τους Κοσοβάρους, για την ακρίβεια ασκούσε και ασκεί ακόμα ισχυρή κριτική στους πολιτικούς της κυβέρνησης της Πρίστινας, τόση όση και στην στάση της Σερβίας. Προωθούσε την ιδέα ενός Κοσόβου που θα έχει την προοπτική να απεξαρτηθεί από κάθε τι παλιό όπως η Σερβική κηδεμονία και ότι νέο όπως ήταν η διεθνής κοινότητα.

Ιδεολογικά ορθό και σίγουρα για το μέσο κοσσοβάρο θα ακούγεται μάλλον φιλόδοξα αληθινό. Αυτό βέβαια όσον αφορά στην αποκόλληση από την οικονομική και τεχνοκρατική βοήθεια που παρέχει ο διεθνής παράγοντας με την πλειάδα των ξένων αποστολών στην περιοχή.

Για το θέμα με τη Σερβία, η απόφαση του Διεθνούς Δικαστηρίου ήταν από ότι φαίνεται, μια ήττα για τη σερβική διπλωματία. Η Σερβία παίζει ακόμα τα τελευταία της χαρτιά με το διάλογο μεταξύ Βελιγραδίου και Πρίστινας να περιορίζεται σε τεχνικά θέματα επιφάνειας και όλοι περιμένουμε να δούμε πως θα μπορούσε να ρυθμιστεί το ζήτημα του βορείου Κοσόβου με τη σερβική πλειονότητα. Εκεί άλλωστε παρατηρούνται όλες σχεδόν οι εστίες εντάσεως τα τελευταία χρόνια. Εκεί θα τελειώσει και το διπλωματικό παιχνίδι.

Το κίνημα του Κουρτι ποτέ δε δέχτηκε να θεωρηθεί αυτό το κομμάτι γης σέρβικο και παρά το γεγονός ότι πήρε θεσμική μορφή όταν μεταμορφώθηκε σε κόμμα, δε δίστασε να προκαλεί επεισόδια κλείνοντας διαβάσεις προκειμένου να εμποδιστούν σέρβικα φορτηγά να εισέλθουν στο Κόσοβο. Αντίποινα θα μπορούσε να πει κανείς σε ότι οι σέρβοι εκδηλώνουν κατά καιρούς προσπαθώντας να δείξουν ποιος έχει τον έλεγχο στην περιοχή και κατά πόσο αδιάφορους τους αφήνουν οι αρχές επιβολής του νόμου των κοσοβάρων γειτόνων τους.

Η εξέλιξη αυτή με την πολικότητα που αναπτύσσεται, ένα εθνικιστικό - κατά χαρακτηρισμό - κόμμα που δρα με τέτοιες τακτικές από τη μια και τους σκληροπυρηνικούς σέρβους του βορείου Κοσόβου να ρίχνουν λάδι στη φωτιά σε κάθε ευκαιρία, από την άλλη, είναι το λιγότερο ανησυχητικό.

Το θέμα είναι ότι η περιοχή δεν έχει ησυχάσει ακόμα. Η εθνικιστική στάση του Κούρτι, με το κόμμα του να συμμετέχει στη Βουλή της Πριστινας με εκφάνσεις αλβανικού εξτρεμισμού και αλυτρωτισμού σε πολιτικό πλέον επίπεδο, είναι αποτέλεσμα κοινωνικοπολιτικών ζυμώσεων πολλών ετών.

Η μετάβαση από τους «ήρωες» μαχητές του UCK, του απελευθερωτικού στρατού του Κοσόβου, σε ένα πολιτικό σύστημα που τους μετέτρεψε σε πρωθυπουργούς και αρχηγούς κομμάτων, είχε τις παρενέργειες της. Σε όλα αυτά βέβαια υφίσταται η μητρική - όπως κάποιοι εθνικιστικοί κύκλοι θέλουν να εξελιχθεί – σχέση με την Αλβανία. Μια σχέση που περισσότερο συντηρεί αποσχιστικές τάσεις και ακραίες επεκτατικές αντιλήψεις στην ευρύτερη περιοχή των Βαλκανίων και ελάχιστα προάγει την καλή γειτονία.

Ιωάννης Γιαννακόπουλος

Σάββατο 28 Ιανουαρίου 2012

Πολιτική βούληση ή λαϊκή ανέχεια;

Δεν ξέρω τελικά αν οι οικονομικές εξελίξεις με όλα αυτά που διαβάζουμε, βλέπουμε και ακούμε θα έχουν κάποιο τέλος… κάποια στιγμή. Και εννοώ μια κατάληξη για το λαό που ζει στην αμφιβολία και την επιφύλαξη. Τι θα προκύπτει κάθε φορά που φτάνουν οι τροϊκανοί στην Ελλάδα; Το σίγουρο είναι ότι δεν έρχονται με τις καλύτερες προθέσεις, ίσως να αφήνεται να εννοηθεί ότι με τα μέτρα που μας επιβάλλουν, παρά μας προτείνουν, θα μας βγάλουν από την ύφεση … κάποια στιγμή. Όλοι θα αναρωτιόμαστε τι μας επιφυλάσσει το μέλλον.

Με τις πιο δυσοίωνες προβλέψεις μάλλον δεν θα πρέπει να περιμένουμε και πολλά , ενώ οι πιο αισιόδοξοι βλέπουν «ανάπτυξη» και επιστροφή στις αγορές όπως ακούμε καθημερινά να λέγεται, σε βάθος μερικών ετών. Δεν είναι βέβαια ο μόνος όρος που ακούμε καθημερινά, ένα σωρό άλλες έννοιες δικαιολογούν τη συρρίκνωση του εισοδήματος μας.

Ξαφνικά, ανακαλύψαμε ότι υπάρχει φοροδιαφυγή με έναν δημοσιογραφίστικο (πουλάει άλλωστε τώρα αυτό) τρόπο πλέον. Καταλάβαμε καλά πως οι «σκαφάτοι», διάφοροι επιχειρηματίες και πολλοί άλλοι δεν πληρώνανε ότι τους αναλογούσε και ήταν ένα κοινό μυστικό το οποίο έπρεπε να φτάσουμε εδώ για να αποκαλυφθεί από τη «αδιάβλητη» δημοσιογραφία των ΜΜΕ.

Από την άλλη, η πολιτική αναλγησία δε βοηθάει και πάρα πολύ, κάποιοι «αδιάβαστοι» ψήφησαν μάλλον το αναπόφευκτο (οπότε τι νόημα είχε να ξέρουν το μνημονιακό περιεχόμενο;) και κάποιοι άλλοι ασχολούνται με διαδοχολογίες και άλλα εσωκομματικά ζητήματα. Ο λαός ασχολείται με την επιβίωσή του. Το μήνυμα όμως είναι ξεκάθαρο, δεν θα έπρεπε να μας φταίει η πολιτική αλλά οι άνθρωποι που την υπηρετούν. Καιρός να αλλάξει αυτό με μια πιο υπεύθυνη στάση εκ μέρους του λαού και των θεσμικών αντιπροσώπων του.

Κάποιος κάποτε όμως πρέπει να κοιτάξει το λαό στα μάτια και να του εξηγήσει αν και πότε θα τελειώσει αυτό το μαρτύριο της σταγόνας. Αν είναι να χρεοκοπήσουμε ας γίνει τώρα να μετρήσουμε τα λεφτά μας και να προγραμματίσουμε τα έξοδά μας. Αν είναι να προχωρήσουμε ας δούμε πώς θα υλοποιήσουμε την ανάπτυξη, πως θα προχωρήσουμε στις εξαγωγές και πότε επιτέλους θα αξιοποιήσουμε, προς όφελός μας όμως, τις πλουτοπαραγωγικές πηγές μας. Ότι μας προσφέρει απλόχερα αυτή η γη, υπόγεια και επίγεια.

Ας μην μιλήσουμε καλύτερα για την ΑΟΖ και για τα οικονομικά και γεωπολιτικά οφέλη της ανακήρυξής της στη μεσόγειο τουλάχιστον. Μεγάλη υπόθεση που δύσκολα δείχνει να υλοποιείται. Άλλωστε οι ανατολικοί μας γείτονες έχουν σοβαρές αντιρρήσεις. Τα παραπάνω δεν αποτελούν οικονομική ανάλυση, άλλωστε κάτι τέτοιο το κάνει πληθώρα τηλεστάρ της οικονομικής επιστήμης και παντός επιστητού στην τηλεόραση τα τελευταία χρόνια. Είναι μάλλον κοινωνιολογική προσέγγιση.

Έφτασε η ώρα της πολιτικής βούλησης να πρωταγωνιστήσει, γιατί ως τώρα ο έλληνας έχει αποδείξει με τη σιωπηρή σχεδόν αποδοχή ότι, μπορεί να υπομένει και στα δύσκολα, έχει την παιδεία να το κάνει, απλά χρειάζεται σωστή καθοδήγηση για να αποδείξει στους τεχνοκράτες του εξωτερικού, που με περισσό θράσος απαιτούν να φτάσουμε στην εξαθλίωση, ότι έχουμε και τη θέληση αλλά και το θάρρος να διεκδικήσουμε την ευημερία μας.

Ιωάννης Γιαννακόπουλος

Πέμπτη 26 Ιανουαρίου 2012

Simitis: Turkey-Greece war would last 2 hours

25 January 2012 / TODAY’S ZAMAN, İSTANBUL

Former Greek Prime Minister Kostas Simitis has said that Greece’s arms race with Turkey would give the country no advantage in a possible confrontation with Turkey, deeming it a waste of economic resources of the crisis-torn country, saying Greece would only last two hours in the event of a war with Turkey.

“Should a war with Turkey erupt, Greece’s armament would be of no use. Such a war will be fought for two or three hours,” Simitis claimed at a conference organized by the Germany-based Heinrich Böll Foundation in Berlin on Tuesday.

Greece, the country with the highest military expenditure-to-gross domestic product (GDP) ratio in Europe, has in a way become a victim of its arms race with Turkey. Despite claiming that Turkey tries to provoke the existing conflicts between the two countries, Simitis said: “Greece should not waste its resources on armament; it should instead turn to the EU to resolve any conflicts. The EU should be a guarantor for Greece’s external security.”

Τετάρτη 25 Ιανουαρίου 2012

Bosnian police arrest Wahhabi leader


Source: Tanjug, Dnevni avaz

GORNJA MAOČA -- Strong police forces arrested Nusret Imamović, his brother Eldin and one more person in the village of Gornja Maoča on Wednesday.


The strong police forces have been searching several locations in the Wahhabi community in the the village of Gornja Maoča since Wednesday morning.

“The goal of the SIPA officers’ operation is to collect evidence that could be tied to the mentioned attack on the U.S. Embassy and all the evidence that will possibly be found will be handed over to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Prosecution after forensic processing,” SIPA has reported.

The Bosnia-Herzegovina Prosecution and State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) have announced that more details about the operation will be released later during the day.

According to unofficial information, around 150 SIPA members and police officers are taking part in the operation.

It was determined earlier that Melvid Jašarević, who fired at the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo in late October, had spent time in Gornja Maoča before the attack.

Κυριακή 15 Ιανουαρίου 2012

Επεισόδια μεταξύ αστυνομίας και Αλβανών διαδηλωτών στη Σερβία

Συμπλοκές σημειώθηκαν σήμερα μεταξύ της σερβικής αστυνομίας και Αλβανών υποστηρικτών του κινήματος «αυτοδιάθεση», οι οποίοι απέκλεισαν τη διάβαση «Μέρνταρε» στα διοικητικά σύνορα Κοσόβου - Σερβίας.

Σύμφωνα με εκτιμήσεις δημοσιογράφων που βρίσκονται στην περιοχή, στον αποκλεισμό των συνοριακών διαβάσεων συμμετέχουν 2000 - 3000 πολίτες του Κοσόβου. Οι διαδηλωτές δεν επιτρέπουν την είσοδο στο Κόσοβο φορτηγών οχημάτων που μεταφέρουν εμπορεύματα από τη Σερβία.

Ισχυρές αστυνομικές δυνάμεις έχουν αναπτυχθεί στην περιοχή, αποτρέποντας στους διαδηλωτές να προσεγγίσουν το μεθοριακό σταθμό. Πριν από λίγο, η αστυνομία έκανε χρήση δακρυγόνων για να αποτρέψει επίθεση με πέτρες από ομάδα διαδηλωτών. Κατά τη συμπλοκή τραυματίστηκε ελαφρά ένας αστυνομικός ενώ τραυματίες υπάρχουν και στις γραμμές των διαδηλωτών.

Σκοπός των κινητοποιήσεων είναι να αποτραπούν οι εμπορικές συναλλαγές μεταξύ του Κοσόβου και της Σερβίας.

Το κίνημα «αυτοδιάθεση», που εκπροσωπείται στη βουλή, επιδιώκει τη διακοπή των σχέσεων με τη Σερβία μέχρι να αναγνωρίσει το Βελιγράδι την ανεξαρτησία του Κοσόβου. Τάσσεται επίσης κατά της παρουσίας ξένων στρατιωτικών δυνάμεων στο Κόσοβ, ζητώντας παράλληλα να επιβληθεί με τη βία η κυριαρχία της Πρίστινας στο βόρειο Κόσοβο όπου ο σερβικός πληθυσμός αποτελεί πλειοψηφία
http://www.protothema.gr/world/article/?aid=171209

Παρασκευή 13 Ιανουαρίου 2012

Forecast



There are periods when the international system undergoes radical shifts in a short time. The last such period was 1989-1991. During that time, the Soviet empire collapsed. The Japanese economic miracle ended. The Maastricht Treaty creating contemporary Europe was signed. Tiananmen Square defined China as a market economy dominated by an unchallenged Communist Party, and so on. Fundamental components of the international system shifted radically, changing the rules for the next 20 years.

We are in a similar cycle, one that began in 2008 and is still playing out. In this period, the European Union has stopped functioning as it did five years ago and has yet to see its new form defined. China has moved into a difficult social and economic phase, with the global recession severely affecting its export-oriented economy and its products increasingly uncompetitive due to inflation. The U.S. withdrawal from Iraq has created opportunities for an Iranian assertion of power that could change the balance of power in the region. The simultaneous shifts in Europe, China and the Middle East open the door to a new international framework replacing the one created in 1989-1991.

Our forecast for 2012 is framed by the idea that we are in the midst of what we might call a generational shift in the way the world works. The processes are still under way, and we will therefore have to consider the future of Europe, China and the Middle East in some detail before drawing a conclusion. The 2012 forecast is unique in that it is not a forecast for one year in a succession of years, all basically framed by the same realities. Rather, it is a year in which the individual forecasts point to a new generational reality and a redefinition of how the world works.

2012 may not be the conclusion of this transformative process. Neither was 1991 the conclusion. However, just as 1991 was the year in which it became clear that the old world of the Cold War no longer functioned, 2012 is the year in which it will become clear that the Post-Cold War world has come to an end, being replaced by changed players and changed dynamics.

Europe

The European Union and eurozone will survive 2012, and Europe's financial crisis will stabilize, at least temporarily. However, Stratfor expects Europe to continue its long, painful slide into deepening recession. We expect accelerating capital flight out of peripheral European countries as investors in Europe and farther afield lose confidence in the European system. We expect financial support measures to be withdrawn on occasion to maintain pressure on governments to implement fiscal reforms, which will lead to financial scares.

However, the driving force behind developments in Europe in 2012 will be political, not economic. Germany, seeing an opportunity in the ongoing financial crisis, is using its superior financial and economic position to attempt to alter the eurozone's structure to its advantage. The core of this "reform" effort is to hardwire tight financial controls into as many European states as possible, both in a new intergovernmental treaty and in each state's national constitution. Normally, we would predict failure for such an effort: Sacrificing budgetary authority to an outside power would be the most dramatic sacrifice of state sovereignty yet in the European experiment -- a sacrifice that most European governments would strongly resist. However, the Germans have six key advantages in 2012.

First, there are very few scheduled electoral contests, so the general populace of most European states will not be consulted on the exercise. Of the eurozone states, only France, Slovakia and Slovenia face scheduled national elections. Out of these three, France is by far the most critical: The Franco-German partnership is the core of the European system, and any serious breach between the two would herald the end of the European Union. If Germany is to compromise on its efforts for anyone, it will be for France, and if France needs another country in order to secure its own position in Europe, it needs Germany. Consequently, the two have chosen to collaborate rather than compete thus far, and we expect their partnership to survive the year. Luckily for the German effort, French elections will be at the very beginning of the ratification process, so any possible modifications to the German plan will come early.

Second, Germany only needs the approval of the 17 eurozone states -- rather than the 27 members of the full European Union -- to forward its plan with credibility. That the United Kingdom has already opted out is inconvenient for those seeking a pan-European process, but it does not derail the German effort.

Third, the process of approving a treaty such as this will take significant time, and some aspects of the reform process can be pushed back. European leaders are expected to sign the new treaty in March, and the rest of the year and some of 2013 will be used to seek ratification by individual countries. Amending national constitutions to satisfy Germany will be the bitterest part of the process, but much of that can be put off until 2013, and judgment by European institutions over how the revision process was handled comes still later. Such delays allow political leaders the option of pushing back the most politically risky portions of the process for months or years.

Fourth, the Germans are willing to apply significant pressure. Nearly all EU states count Germany as the largest destination for their exports, and such exports are critical for local employment. In 2011, Germany used its superior economic and financial position as leverage to help ease the elected leaderships of Greece and Italy out of office, replacing them with unelected former EU bureaucrats who are now working to implement aspects of the German program. Similar pressures could be brought to bear against additional states in 2012.

Those most likely to clash with Germany are Ireland, Finland, the Netherlands and Spain. Ireland wants the terms of its bailout program to be softened and is threatening a national referendum that could derail the ratification process. Finland's laws require parliamentary approval by a two-thirds majority for some aspects of ratification. The normally pro-European government of the Netherlands is a weak coalition that can only rule with the support of other parties, one of which is strongly euroskeptic. Spain must attempt the most painful austerity efforts of any non-bailout state if the reform process is to have credibility -- and it must do so amid record-high unemployment and a shrinking economy. Also, if Greece decides to hold new elections in 2012, European stakeholders will attempt to ensure that the new government in Athens does not end its collaboration with the European Central Bank (ECB), European Commission and International Monetary Fund. None of these issues will force an automatic confrontation, but all will have to be managed to ensure successful ratification, and the Germans have demonstrated that they have many tools with which to compel other governments.

Fifth, the Europeans are scared, which makes them willing to do things they would not normally do -- such as implementing austerity and ratifying treaties they dislike. Agreeing to sacrifice sovereignty in principle to maintain the European economic system in practice will seem a reasonable trade. The real political crisis will not come until the sacrifice of sovereignty moves from the realm of theory to application, but that will not occur in 2012. In many ways, the political pliability of European governments now is all about staving off unbearable economic catastrophe for another day.

The economic deferment of that pain is the sixth German advantage. Here, the primary player is the ECB. The financial crisis has two aspects: Over-indebted European governments are lurching toward defaults that would collapse the European system, and European banks (the largest purchasers of European government debt) are broadly insolvent -- their collapse would similarly break apart the European system. In December, the ECB indicated that it was willing to put up 20 billion euros ($28 billion) a week for sovereign bond purchases on secondary markets to support struggling eurozone governments, while extending low-interest, long-term liquidity loans to European banks in unlimited volumes. The bond program is large enough to potentially purchase three-fourths of all expected eurozone government debt issuances for 2012, while the first day of the loan program extended 490 billion euros in fresh credit to ailing banks.

Together these two measures make a eurozone financial meltdown highly unlikely in 2012, but they will greatly degrade European competitiveness and efficiency. That will be a problem for another time, though. For now, ECB actions are buying economic and political breathing room: economic in that austerity efforts can be somewhat softer than they would otherwise need to be, and political in that there is a feeling that Germany is willing to compromise somewhat on the issues of budgetary discipline today in order to achieve its broader goals of budgetary control tomorrow. Therefore, while the financial support is not exactly buying good will from other European states, it is certainly buying time.

As the ratification process proceeds, European hostility toward Germany and Brussels will increase. Internationally, the key theme will be states attempting to protect themselves from what they see as a growing -- and unwelcome -- German intrusion into their internal affairs. At the national level, the deepening recession will translate into general anger toward the government's announced austerity measures. The relative dearth of elections will deny that anger its normal release valve of centrist opposition parties, emboldening nationalist and extremist movements and leading to social unrest.

Political and financial turbulence will persist within this framework as Germany negotiates the new treaty with other eurozone countries. Though the core of these negotiations is a highly contentious abdication of national fiscal sovereignty, Europe is highly likely to adopt the new treaty since a perceived failure would dramatically accelerate the collapse of EU political structures and implementation will not happen in 2012.

Former Soviet Union
Russia's Challenges

In 2012, the Kremlin will face numerous challenges: social unrest, restructuring Russia's political makeup (both inside and outside of the Kremlin) and major economic shifts due to the crisis in Europe. The social unrest seen at the end of 2011 will continue festering throughout the presidential elections in 2012. Kremlin chief Vladimir Putin will have to reshape the political landscape from one dominated by his party to one that accounts for the increasing support for the nationalists and a new class of young, liberal activists. Simultaneously, Putin will restructure his inner circle of Kremlin loyalists, who have allowed infighting to divert their attention from their roles in tackling Russia's social unrest and financial problems. None of this will significantly diminish Putin's authority. The Kremlin will also have to adjust its economy in 2012 to accommodate changes in previous plans involving billions of dollars in investments from Europe in some of Russia's most strategic sectors. The crisis in Europe means any such investments will be significantly reduced, so the Kremlin will have to restructure the economic plans for its modernization and privatization programs and fund many of the projects itself. Putin will be able to navigate through these obstacles, though they will take up much of the Kremlin's attention. None of these factors will fundamentally change Russia's direction either domestically or in its foreign policy.

Russian Resurgence

Russia will continue building its influence in its former Soviet periphery in 2012, particularly by institutionalizing its relationships with many former Soviet states. Russia will build upon its Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan as it evolves into the Common Economic Space (CES). This larger institution will allow the scope of Russia's influence over Minsk and Astana, as well as new member countries such as Kyrgyzstan and possibly Tajikistan, to expand from the economic sphere into politics and security as Moscow lays the groundwork for the eventual formation of the Eurasian Union, which it is hoping to start around 2015.

As Ukraine's chances to grow closer to the European Union decrease, Kiev will realize that Moscow is the only outside power it can turn to. Russia will be able to take advantage of Ukraine's inability to maneuver and will gain access to strategic Ukrainian assets, possibly including minority control in its natural gas transit system. However, Ukraine will continue to resist the institutionalization of Russia's influence via the CES by maintaining a degree of cooperation with the West.

In the Baltic countries -- which, unlike other former Soviet states, are committed members of NATO and the European Union -- Russia's ultimate goal is to neutralize the countries' pro-Western and anti-Russian policies, a goal it will make progress toward in Latvia in 2012. It will face setbacks in Lithuania, but Lithuania will not be able to seriously challenge Russia's maneuvers in the region because of ongoing difficulties for its primary supporters: NATO and the European Union.

Russia and the West

Russia will continue managing various crises with the West -- mainly the United States and NATO -- while shaping its relationships in Europe. Moscow and Washington will continue their standoff over ballistic missile defense and U.S. support for Central Europe, and Moscow will react to the ongoing row by increasing security pressure on Central Europe and bolstering its economic presence in the region. Russia will use these crises as an opportunity to deepen divisions among the Europeans, between the Europeans and the United States, and within NATO while promoting the perception that Russia is being forced to act aggressively. The security situation will become tenser, and Russia will attempt to push these crises with the United States to the brink without actually rupturing relations -- a difficult balance.

Russia will also use the financial and political crises in Europe to bolster its influence in strategic countries and sectors. Moscow and Berlin will continue their close relationship, especially in the areas of economics and security, but Russia will focus more on Central Europe in areas of security and energy and in picking up assets. There is no real counter to Russia in Europe, as the Europeans will be absorbed with domestic and EU issues. But this does not mean Russia has a free pass, as it must still manage the domestic effects of its neighbors' crisis.

Central Asia

Numerous factors will undermine Central Asia's stability in 2012, but they will not lead to a major breaking point in the region this year. Protests over deteriorating economic conditions will occur throughout the region, particularly in Kazakhstan, though these will be contained to the region and will not result in overly disruptive violence. Serious issues in Kazakhstan's banking sector could lead to a financial crisis, though the government will be able to manage the difficulties and contain it during 2012 by using the oil revenues it has saved up.

The more pressing problem is the rising Islamist militancy in the region. Sporadic attacks will continue in Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan could see an increase in attacks. However, these attacks will not achieve their strategic goal of overthrowing regimes or coalesce into a transnational movement capable of destabilizing the region. In addition to these security tensions, looming successions for the longtime leaders in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan will create political tensions, but barring the death of either leader, no major political upheavals are expected.

Middle East
Iran and the Saudi Dilemma

Iran's efforts to expand its influence will be the primary issue for the Middle East in 2012. The U.S. military withdrawal from Iraq has rendered Iran the pre-eminent military power in the Persian Gulf, but Tehran cannot count on the United States being as constrained beyond this year, and Turkey, Iran's natural regional counterweight, is rising steadily, albeit slowly. Iran's efforts to consolidate and extend its regional influence must therefore accelerate this year before its window of opportunity closes. Iran will still be operating under heavy constraints, however, and will therefore be unable to fundamentally alter the politics of the region in its favor.

Iran's regional expansion will be felt most deeply by Saudi Arabia. The Saudi royals now doubt that the United States has the ability or the willingness to fully guarantee Riyadh's interests. Adding to Saudi Arabia's vulnerabilities, the Gulf Cooperation Council states fear that if Iran is not contained within Iraq, it will exploit continued Shiite unrest in Bahrain and in Saudi Arabia's Shia-concentrated, oil-rich Eastern Province. In 2012, Saudi Arabia will lead efforts to shore up and consolidate the defenses of Gulf Cooperation Council members to try to ward off the threat posed by Iran, but such efforts will not be a sufficient replacement for the United States and the role it plays as a security guarantor. A critical part of Iran's regional agenda for the year will be to force Riyadh into an accommodation that benefits Iran and allows Saudi Arabia some reprieve. This could lead to temporary truces between the two adversaries, but given Iran's constraints and limited timetable, Saudi Arabia is more likely to stay committed to the U.S. security framework in the region -- for lack of better options.


Turmoil in Iraq and Syria


The effects of Iran's expansion efforts will be most visible in Iraq and Syria. In Iraq, Iran's main challenge is to consolidate Shiite power among several competing groups. As Iraq's fractured Shiite leadership tries to solidify its influence with Iranian support, Iraq's Sunni and Kurdish factions increasingly will be put on the defensive. This ethno-sectarian struggle and the security vacuum created by the U.S. withdrawal will degrade Iraq's overall security conditions. Meanwhile, Turkey will attempt to contain the spread of Iranian influence in northern Iraq by building up political, economic, military and intelligence assets.

In Syria, the ultimate goal of Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the United States will be to disrupt Iran's Shiite arc of influence by trying to crack Syrian President Bashar al Assad's regime. However, without direct foreign military intervention, the Syrian regime is unlikely to collapse. Al Assad will continue to struggle in trying to stamp out domestic unrest. The regime's limited options to deal with the crisis will force Syria to further rely on Iran for support, which will allow Tehran to reinforce its presence in the Mediterranean.

Stratfor cannot rule out the remote possibility that the al Assad clan will be coerced into a political exit. Such an outcome would risk inciting a sectarian struggle within the regime. Iran's goal is for Syria to maintain a regime -- regardless of who leads it -- that will remain favorable to Iranian interests, but Iran's ability to influence the situation is limited, and finding a replacement to hold the regime together will be difficult. It should be noted that the battle for Syria cannot take place without spilling over into Lebanon. In that regard, Lebanon faces a difficult year as proxy battles intensify between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Levant.

Turkey's Struggles

Overwhelmed by instability in its periphery, Turkey will continue to face significant challenges to its regional ascendency. Despite its rhetoric, Turkey will not undertake significant overt military action in Syria unless the United States leads the intervention -- a scenario Stratfor regards as improbable -- though it will continue efforts to mold an opposition in Syria and counterbalance Iranian influence in Iraq. Ankara will thus work to maintain a decent bilateral relationship with Tehran despite growing tensions between the two. Economic conditions in Europe will slow Turkey's economic growth, Kurdish militancy in Turkey will remain a significant threat, and concerns over Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan's health could turn the government's focus inward as it tries to work through a contentious set of proposed constitutional changes. On the foreign policy front, Turkey will try to influence the rise of political Islamists, particularly in Egypt and Syria, but Ankara's own constraints will prevent it from taking meaningful steps in that regard.

Egypt's Political Transition

Egypt's turbulent political transition likely will give rise to a parliament with a significant Islamist presence, thereby complicating the ruling military elite's hold on power. However, the democratic transition will be a partial one at best; the country's fractious opposition and impotent parliament will continue to suffer from internal divisions and will be unable to overrule the military on issues of national strategic importance. Thus, the military will remain the de facto authority of the state.

Concerns over the country's struggling economy will outweigh the military's concerns over its political opposition. Egypt's preoccupation with its economic and political issues will undermine its ability to patrol its Sinai buffer, leading to increased tensions with Israel. However, both sides will continue to maintain the peace treaty that has been the foundation of Israeli-Egyptian relations for the past generation.

The Hamas Agenda

Hamas will take advantage of the slowly growing political clout of Islamists throughout the region in hopes of presenting itself to neighboring Arab governments and the West as a pragmatic and reconcilable political alternative to Fatah. These moves will help protect Hamas from the potential regime crisis in Syria (where its politburo is based) and bolster its relationships with Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia. At the same time, Hamas will be on alert for tactical opportunities to undermine security in the Sinai Peninsula with the hope of creating a crisis between Egypt and Israel.

Egypt's preoccupations and Hamas' expanded room to maneuver will incentivize the Jordanian leadership to strengthen its ties with Hamas. It will also allow Jordan to manage its own unrest by building more credibility among Islamists, leverage its relations with Fatah and keep a tab on Hamas' actions as the Jordanian monarchs adjust to changing regional dynamics.

East Asia

Three things will shape events in East Asia: China's response to the economic crisis and possible social turmoil amid a leadership transition; the European Union's debt crisis and economic slowdown sapping demand for East Asia's exports; and regional interaction with the U.S. re-engagement in the Asia-Pacific region.

The 2008 financial crisis exposed the inherent weaknesses of the Chinese economy, which, like its East Asian powerhouse predecessors, largely was based on a growth model driven by exports and government-led investment. While Beijing had been aware for some time of the need to shift toward a more balanced economic model, the continued slump in Europe and fears of another global slowdown have forced the government to face the challenges of economic restructuring now, rather than constantly staving them off. Even in the best of times, the redirection of an economy the size of China's would be difficult, but the pressure for change comes amid a leadership transition, when Beijing is particularly sensitive to any disruptions. With the politburo lineup changing in October and the new state leaders taking office in early 2013, the Communist Party of China (CPC) is focused on maintaining social stability to preserve the legacy of the outgoing leadership and solidify the legitimacy of the incoming leadership.

A rapid drop in economic growth poses a serious threat to China in 2012; a modest slowdown is widely expected this year due to the weakening export sector, a slump in the real estate market, and investment and risks to the banking system. Beijing is betting the decline will remain at a manageable level -- at least for a year of transition. The sharp drop in demand from Europe will harm the export sector in particular, with growth likely reduced to single digits. This declining external demand will threaten the already weakened export-oriented manufacturing industry, which has experienced rising costs in labor, raw materials and utilities as well as appreciating currency on top of its already thin-to-nonexistent profit margins. China will seek to compensate in part by refocusing on exports to the United States and expanding in emerging markets in Southeast Asia, Latin America or Africa, though this will not fully make up for the drop-off from Europe. Moreover, growing trade protectionism because of the economic downturn and political considerations -- especially the upcoming U.S. election season -- will likely put Chinese manufacturers at the center of trade frictions, making their position even more vulnerable. Beijing will employ traditional tools including targeted credit, tax reductions and direct subsidies to mitigate the risks of rising unemployment and bankruptcy in the financially strained manufacturing sector.

While Beijing knows that rolling out another massive fiscal stimulus and bank loans as it did in 2008-2009 is unsustainable and would put the economy at risk, it sees few other short-term options and thus will use government-led investment to sustain growth in 2012. Beijing will resume and launch a number of large infrastructure projects even at the expense of overcapacity and lack of productivity. However, accounting for around 10 percent of gross domestic product and a quarter of fixed investment, the decline in the real estate sector due to Beijing's tightening measures since 2010 represents one of the largest threats to Beijing's effort to stabilize growth. With affordable housing projects -- Beijing's plan to offset the negative consequences from falling real estate prices and weakening investment -- unlikely to reach their designated goal, Beijing may have to selectively relax its real estate tightening policy in 2012 while trying to avoid overcompensating by causing a sharp market rebound or property price inflation. The ruling Communist Party had promised it would bring these issues under control; its failure to do so could undermine the Party's credibility.

The continued high-level credit boom combined with the need to work out nonperforming loans (NPL) from the 2008-2009 stimulus will bring China into heightened NPL risk. The actual NPL ratio may rise as high as 8-12 percent in the next few years. At least 4.6 trillion yuan ($729 billion) out of a government-estimated local debt of 10.7 trillion yuan is set to mature within two years, and Beijing expects 2.5 trillion to 3 trillion yuan of the total risk to turn sour. The NPL risk, the 2.1 trillion-yuan debt from investment in the railway system and the massive informal lending from the shadow banking system that grew significantly during Beijing's credit tightening pose a systemic risk to the banking sector. Beijing may have to take some pre-emptive actions, such as refinancing measures or capital injections, in 2012 to ensure Chinese banks are able to maintain confidence in China's financial system. China's leaders, faced with near-term stabilizing options and long-term deep reforms, will choose the former, postponing the crisis but amplifying it when it becomes unavoidable in the future.

Given the economic uncertainty and political sensitivity surrounding the leadership transition, political elites in Beijing will attempt consensus at the highest levels. As it learned from the Tiananmen Square incident, CPC factional infighting exploited at a sensitive time is a serious risk, and we expect to see measures to ensure ideological and cultural control throughout the Party and down through the rest of society. Meanwhile, the priority to ensure a smooth transition means Beijing will be much less tolerant of actions that could spread instability, though Beijing is also cultivating pre-emptive methods for social control, such as community-level management or providing carefully controlled outlets for expressing grievances to better manage the country's social frustration, which will likely be exacerbated by the deteriorating economic situation.

Internationally, China will continue to accelerate its resource acquisition and outward investment strategy. As domestic problems mount, China may use external disputes to ease public dissatisfaction. Anticipating U.S. economic and trade pressure due to the electoral season and strategic encroachment in China's periphery, Beijing will focus its attention on reducing miscalculation and stressing interdependence in its relations with Washington while clarifying its response to the U.S engagement. Meanwhile, China will balance nationalistic initiatives with maintaining neighborly relations -- particularly with the South China Sea claimant countries, India and Japan -- and countering perceived moves by the United States to constrain China's economic influence in the region and lines of supply. The South China Sea claimant countries, including Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam, will respond by accelerating their military purchases, taking advantage of the U.S. re-engagement efforts to hedge against China.

Most Asian countries -- which showed a strong economic recovery throughout 2010 and early 2011 -- will experience reduced growth amid the global economic slowdown. As the most important economic partner to many countries, China will increase its economic assistance and trade to Association of Southeast Asian Nations countries to leverage its influence. Beijing hopes to again project economic power in the region through aid, the import of consumer goods, currency swaps and regional trade agreements, but Beijing's role may also face challenges by renewed interest from other nations -- for example, the United States and Japan.

The death of North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has increased uncertainty on the Korean Peninsula. The first six months of the year will be critical as the unity of the regime is tested amid the leadership transfer. The leadership structure between civilian and military elements was established in recent years to strengthen the role of the Workers' Party of Korea as one of the pillars of power and to rebalance the military's role, but the process was not yet complete at the time of Kim's death. North Korean leaders are unlikely to fundamentally change the direction of Pyongyang's foreign policy in the near term. Their attention initially will be focused internally, and they will seek to avoid any sudden shift in policy that could destabilize the regime or significantly increase foreign pressure. China will look to make a push to ensure even greater influence on the Korean Peninsula during the transition period. In addition, bilateral discussions with the United States on resuming the six-party nuclear talks were showing progress before Kim's death, and Pyongyang is likely to restart these discussions sometime during the year.

South Asia

The U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan will not maintain sufficient force levels long enough to militarily defeat the Taliban -- and their various factions -- or pacify the country. But the Taliban will not be in a position to drive the United States and its allies from the country by force. Force structure choices must be made in 2012 to define the war effort through 2014, but the United States and its allies will continue to combat the Taliban in 2012 even as Afghan forces increasingly bear the brunt of the war effort. The United States will continue to consider a political accommodation with the Taliban, but such accommodation is unlikely to be reached this year.

The most important development in South Asia is Pakistan's ongoing political evolution. While other states, including Iran, are interested in shaping the future political landscape of Afghanistan, Pakistan continues to be at the heart of the Afghan war. As such, U.S.-Pakistani tensions will intensify in 2012 as the United States reaches an understanding with Pakistan, which will have to deal with the situation in the region after the United States leaves. Political, religious, ethnic and ideological tensions will intensify inside the country, and these will affect Pakistan, Afghanistan and U.S.-Pakistani relations moving forward.

Latin America
Mexico

Through the first half of 2012, Mexico will be enmeshed in campaigning for its July 1 presidential election. The country faces the possible end of what will be 12 years of rule by the National Action Party (PAN). Faced with public condemnation of rising violence, the PAN has lost a great deal of credibility over the past five years, something likely to benefit the Institutional Revolutionary Party and the newly unified Revolutionary Democratic Party. We expect no major legislative action under the administration of outgoing President Felipe Calderon as the three main parties compete for public approval. The new president takes office Dec. 1, meaning most of the new administration's major policy moves will not occur until 2013.

Regardless of any change in party, Mexico's underlying challenges will remain. The country's drug war rages on, with Los Zetas having consolidated control over most of Mexico's eastern coastal transportation corridor and the Sinaloa cartel having done the same in the west. Both cartels have a significant, growing presence in Central America and relations with South American organized crime. We expect the cartels to intensify their efforts to extend control over regional supply chains in 2012, although the Mexican cartels will remain dependent on relationships with local organized crime in other transit and producing countries. Despite significant territorial control in Mexico by Sinaloa and Los Zetas, numerous smaller criminal entities are still struggling for access to key transport hubs such as Acapulco. Meanwhile, the two main cartels will continue to attack each other in critical transit cities such as Veracruz and Guadalajara.

Continued inter-cartel competition among Mexico's diverse criminal groups will prevent any kind of alliance between Los Zetas and Sinaloa that allows them to abandon violence in favor of more profitable smuggling conditions. Similarly, the government faces severe constraints on its counter-cartel activities. It cannot afford to be seen publicly backing away from attempts to rein in violence. At the same time, any significant uptick in military offensives against the cartels carries the risk of intensifying the violence. The government will therefore attempt to emphasize social and economic policies while maintaining its current, high-tempo counter-cartel strategy.

Brazil

Brazil will spend 2012 focused on mitigating shocks to trade and capital flows from the crisis in Europe. However, with only 10 percent of Brazil's gross domestic product dependent on exports, Brazil is much less vulnerable than many other developing countries. In politics, Brazil will remain focused on trying to strike a balance between growth and inflation during the expected slowdown with judicious fiscal outlays and monetary expansion. Brazil will thus remain primarily focused on domestic issues through 2012. Trade protectionism will play a strong role in efforts to shield vulnerable industries. With global trade slowing, China will look for alternative export markets; these two trends will drive increased bilateral tensions between China and Brazil over the next year. Key Brazilian domestic issues will include ongoing city and border security initiatives; social welfare programs; infrastructure construction; and the development of, and politics surrounding, Brazil's petroleum reserves.

Venezuela

Uncertainty surrounding the health of Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez makes it difficult to forecast the precise direction of Venezuelan politics in 2012. There will certainly be continued speculation about a potential successor from the Chavista elite, and growing dissatisfaction with the status quo among Chavez's base will be a prominent political force. Meanwhile, the political opposition parties -- which at this point appear prepared to unite behind a single candidate to be selected in February -- will make their most credible play for power in a decade. Under these conditions, the 2012 election will serve as a disruptor of Venezuelan politics. While the exact details of the outcome are unpredictable, 2012 will likely see some sort of power transition away from Chavez.

Regardless of who holds power at the end of the year, 2012 will continue to be characterized by growing domestic economic uncertainty, periodic infrastructure failure and poor distribution of basic goods. Dissatisfaction with these and other socio-economic issues will drive further protests, but the majority of political action will be centered on the election.

Cuba

Cuba's slow and cautious transitional measures can be expected to continue in 2012. Key reforms such as making credit and private property available to individuals are under way, and similar reforms, including attempts to loosen travel restrictions, can be expected in the next year. Cuba's ultimate international challenge is to balance the liberalization demands of the United States with its need for subsidized Venezuelan oil. A sudden disruption of these shipments is unlikely, but a political shift in Venezuela could force Cuba to reach out to the United States as a much more powerful -- but also more politically invasive -- economic partner.

Sub-Saharan Africa
Somalia

In 2012, a containment strategy will solidify against Somali jihadists -- both the transnationalist group al Shabaab and its nationalist rival, the Somali Islamic Emirate. This strategy will have three elements. The first will feature African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) forces consolidating their presence in Mogadishu. These forces include peacekeepers from Uganda, Burundi and Djibouti, and additional forces from Sierra Leone will be deployed soon.

In the second part of the strategy, Kenyan troops will strengthen the cordon along the Kenyan border with southern Somalia. The 4,000 Kenyan troops there, nominally part of AMISOM, will hold territory and interdict Somali jihadists moving about the area. Lastly, Ethiopian forces will fortify a cordon along Ethiopia's border with central Somalia, also attempting to hold the territory and interdict jihadists.

To deny the Somali militias propaganda material, AMISOM, the Kenyans and the Ethiopians will not push deep into Somali territory to engage the jihadists. Instead, local militias employing guerrilla tactics will fight the jihadists within the containment zone. The combined efforts will successfully disrupt the jihadists' lines of supply, but they will not bring about their defeat. The United States will continue covert action in the Somali theater. U.S. special operations forces and unmanned aerial vehicles will collect and share intelligence with the Somali government and its allies. Additionally, U.S. forces in East Africa and the Horn of Africa will remain poised to strike high-value Somali jihadists or senior al Qaeda targets, should the opportunity arise.

Nigeria

Nigeria will see sustained militant violence in its northern region. Aggrieved political elites in the north, believing the government of President Goodluck Jonathan stole political power from them, will seek to use the Boko Haram militant group to their advantage. As part of their campaign to regain political power in 2015 national elections, these northern politicians will provide Boko Haram with arms and funding while protecting it politically.

This will enable the group to carry out frequent attacks on Nigerian government and civilian targets in its core area of operations in the country's northeast and northwest. Boko Haram will also conduct operations in the Nigerian capital of Abuja, but these will be rare. Boko Haram's statements will be jihadist and fierce, but the nature of its support will prevent it from carrying out attacks that would trigger an international response and result in a loss of leverage for northern Nigeria's political elite, such as transnational operations or attacks against foreign political or commercial facilities in Nigeria.

The Niger Delta in the south will also see a slow but steady return to militant violence. Though the Jonathan administration has stated that it will serve only from 2011 to 2015, divisions will start to emerge within the Jonathan camp over whether a single term is sufficient. Like their peers in northern Nigeria, political elites in the Niger Delta region, including Jonathan, will start reactivating alliances with regional militant groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND).

Attacks by MEND or other Niger Delta militants in 2012 will be infrequent and ultimately will not threaten oil production. However, they will form the basis for a counter-campaign by the Niger Delta political elite to demand political patronage while the region's elite decides whether to run for the ruling party's nomination for the presidency in the next elections.

Sudan

Domestic opposition in Sudan and South Sudan will prevent both governments from signing a legally binding oil revenue-sharing accord. Instead, they will accept the continuation of ad hoc agreements regarding the distribution of oil revenues. Additionally, U.N. peacekeepers will maintain their deployments in South Sudan and Darfur to respond to border clashes between militias on both sides of the Sudan-South Sudan border. It will take much of the year, but Khartoum and Juba will settle into an informal understanding over border demarcation.

South Africa

South Africa will remain focused on internal rivalries that will inhibit its ability to consolidate its influence in the southern African region. The ruling African National Congress (ANC) will contend with internal rivalries as it moves toward a leadership convention and election in December 2012. South African President Jacob Zuma will be working to secure a second term as ANC president, a post that would effectively make him the party's candidate for South African president in 2014 elections. Simultaneously, the Zuma camp will work to ensure that no rival faction in the ANC gains enough momentum to challenge Zuma.

Τετάρτη 11 Ιανουαρίου 2012

Kosovo Serbs Announce Referendum Plan


Serb leaders in the divided northern Kosovo town of Mitrovica have said that a referendum should be held in the predominantly Serb area to ask residents if they wish to accept Pristina-based institutions.

B92, Tanjug

Mitrovica Mayor Krstimir Pantic said on Sunday that a referendum should be held in northern Kosovo on February 15, which is also Statehood Day in Serbia.

Following a meeting between the representatives of Serbs from northern Kosovo held in Zvecan, Pantic said that the four municipal leaders will make a decision on the holding of the referendum during the week, adding that the date will most likely be confirmed at the joint session of municipalities.

He said that the meeting in Zvecan was attended by the head of the Kosovska Mitrovica District, the presidents of four municipalities from northern Kosovo as well as parliament speakers, and committee presidents in local parliaments.

The Serbian government's regulation on freedom of movement at administrative crossings with Kosovo is unacceptable for the Serbs in Kosovo, Pantic told Tanjug.

The regulation is detrimental to the Serbs living in Kosovo and we do not agree with it, but we do not have the authority to put it out of force, Pantic underlined.

As part of an agreement reached between Pristina and Belgrade in July, citizens of Kosovo will be allowed to enter Serbia with their Kosovo license plates and IDs, which previously was not possible because Belgrade did not recognise documents issued by the authorities in Pristina.

Referring to the barricades blocking some roads in northern Kosovo, Pantic said that they will remain there. He noted, however, that local citizens will not enter into conflict with KFOR and EULEX, the EU rule of law mission, and that if the barricades are removed, the Serbs will set up new ones.

Kosovo Serbs erected barricades in July, some of which have since been taken down, in protest against an attempt by the Kosovo government to take control of the border with Serbia.

Πέμπτη 5 Ιανουαρίου 2012

Η Βοσνία των Βαλκανίων

Όλοι θυμόμαστε, όσο και να μην θέλουμε να έχουμε τέτοιες εικόνες στο μυαλό μας, την τραγική κατάσταση της Βοσνίας Ερζεγοβίνης κατά τη διάρκεια του πολέμου. 'Ίσως τώρα στο Σαράγιεβο να έχουν αφήσει άθικτους τους τοίχους με τις τρύπες από τα οπλοπολυβόλα και τους όλμους εκείνης της εποχής σαν να θέλουν να θυμούνται και οι ίδιοι τι πέρασε αυτή η πόλη και ή χώρα ολάκερη. Ίσως και με μια δόση ειρωνείας να είναι εκεί σαν τουριστική ατραξιόν που και μένα προσωπικά με συγκλόνισε την πρώτη φορά που επισκέφθηκα την πόλη και χάζευα αυτή τη ιδιόμορφη αρχιτεκτονική των τοίχων.

Παραδόξως, ο κόσμος δεν έκρυβε το χαμόγελό του, ούτε μπορούσε να κρύψει όμως τη φτώχεια και την εξαθλίωση σε δημόσιους και μη χώρους δίπλα στα εστιατόρια και τις μπυραρίες που προορίζονταν κατά (οικονομική) αποκλειστικότητα για τους ξένους "έχοντες" που υπηρετούσαν εκεί σε οργανισμούς και διπλωματικές αποστολές. Κατά τ’ άλλα νοιώθεις τα Βαλκάνια μέσα σου και έναν λαό που αντιστέκεται στην κοινωνική και οικονομική ανέχεια. Θα τολμούσε να σκεφτεί κανείς ότι είναι λιγότερο καλομαθημένοι από τους νεοέλληνες και αντιμετωπίζουν τις δυσκολίες με άλλη αντίληψη.

Δυστυχώς μετά από 15 σχεδόν χρόνια όπου και τερμάτισε η ένοπλη σύρραξη στη Βοσνία και Ερζεγοβίνη τίποτα δεν πήγε και τόσο καλά. Και δεν είναι μόνο η οικονομική κατάσταση που ταλανίζεται από αβεβαιότητα, αλλά και η ίδια η πολιτικοκοινωνική συνοχή της χώρας.

Η Βοσνία βρίσκεται σε μια πολύ δύσκολη οικονομική κατάσταση και σε βαθιά κατάθλιψη, συμφώνησαν ομόφωνα τα μέλη που συμμετείχαν στο οικονομικό φόρουμ για την Οικονομική Πολιτική της Βοσνίας το 2012, που πραγματοποιήθηκε στα τέλη του Δεκ 11 στο Σαράγιεβο.

Τι είναι τελικά αυτό που κάνει τους πιο αισιόδοξους να πιστεύουν στη βιωσιμότητα της Β-Ε; Το πιθανότερο τίποτα περισσότερο από την παρουσία της Διεθνούς Κοινότητας με όποια μορφή είναι αυτή, είτε σαν Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση είτε σαν Ηνωμένα Έθνη και ένα σωρό άλλοι Οργανισμοί και Μη Κυβερνητικές Οργανώσεις που συνεχίζουν να δραστηριοποιούνται στην περιοχή.

Το περίπλοκο πολιτικό σύστημα όπως προέκυψε από την ειρηνευτική συμφωνία του Dayton, δεν κατάφερε να γεφυρώσει τα χάσματα μεταξύ των διαφορετικών οντοτήτων και συνεχίζει να αποτελεί εμπόδιο σε σειρά συνταγματικών και θεσμικών μεταρρυθμίσεων.

Σύμφωνα με τον Duljko Hasic, επιμελητή του Εξωτερικού Εμπορίου της Βοσνίας, το δυσμενές πολιτικό και οικονομικό κλίμα, η διαφθορά σε όλα τα κυβερνητικά επίπεδα, οι περιοριστικές πολιτικές δανεισμού των τραπεζών, η δύσκολη κατάσταση της κοινωνικής πρόνοιας και η παντελής απουσία εφαρμογής της ουτοπικής «ευρωπαϊκής πορείας», έχουν οδηγήσει στη δημιουργίας ανησυχητικής κατάστασης για τη χώρα.

Τι μένει περισσότερο να περιμένει μια χώρα στο κατώφλι μια Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης με τόσα προβλήματα, μια διεθνή οικονομική ύφεση που σίγουρα δε βοηθάει την κατάσταση και έναν λαό που δεν θα δυσκολευτεί ακόμα και σήμερα να επανέλθει σε μια εμφύλια σύγκρουση αν αποχωρήσει η Διεθνής Κοινότητα; Μάλλον όχι και πάρα πολλά...

Εμάς όμως τι μας νοιάζει; Δεν είμαστε Βοσνία. Αυτό που θα μπορούσε να μας διδάξει η περίπτωση της Β-Ε είναι, πέρα από τον προβληματισμό για το μέλλον της γειτονίας μας και κατά πόσο αυτό επηρεάζει τη δική μας αυλή, τη δύναμη που πρέπει να αντλήσουμε για να σταθούμε στο ύψος των περιστάσεων αυτές τις δύσκολες εποχές όπου πολιορκούμεθα όπως το Σαράγιεβο, βαλλόμενοι με πυρά που θα αφήσουν τα σημάδια τους μέσα από τους τοίχους για τα επόμενα χρόνια.

Ιωάννης Γιαννακόπουλος

2011 Review: the Balkans

04/01/2012

The handover of former Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladic to the UN tribunal in The Hague was one of the most important events in the Balkans in 2011, a year which was also marked by violent clashes in Kosovo's volatile north.

By Svetla Dimitrova for Southeast European Times -- 04/01/12

In 2011, the remaining two war crimes suspects sought by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) were finally captured and handed over to The Hague-based court.

Another major development was the conclusion of Croatia's EU membership talks in the end of June and the signing of the country's Accession Treaty with the 27-nation bloc on December 9th.

On December 26th, a key freedom of movement agreement between Kosovo and Serbia entered into force. The deal reached during EU-brokered talks allows the residents of each of the two countries to enter into and travel freely inside each other's territory for the first time since Kosovo declared independence from Serbia in February 2008.

On the downside, simmering ethnic tensions continued to plague parts of the Balkans in 2011, with political leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) failing to agree on the formation of a new state-level government for 14 months and an outburst of violence in Kosovo's north.

Mladic, Hadzic behind bars in The Hague

Serbia removed a major obstacle on its EU integration path in 2011, when it handed over former Bosnian Serb military commander Ratko Mladic and wartime Croatian Serb political leader Goran Hadzic to the ICTY.

Mladic was arrested on May 26th and was transferred to The Hague five days later, after nearly 16 years on the run. The 69-year-old former commander of the Bosnian Serb forces faces two counts of genocide over the Srebrenica massacre of more than 7,500 Bosnian Muslim men and boys and the 43-month siege of Sarajevo. An amended indictment of December 16th 2011 charges Mladic also with five counts of crimes against humanity and four of violations of the laws and customs of war.

Owing to concerns about Mladic's health and "in the interest of fair and expeditious" trial, UN judges accepted the prosecutors' request in early December that the number of crimes in the indictment be reduced from 196 to 106.

The start of the trial against Mladic is tentatively scheduled for late March 2012.

Hadzic, 52, was extradited to The Hague on July 22nd, two days after his arrest. The former Croatian Serb political leader, who was captured after seven years on the run, faces a 14-count indictment charging him with war crimes and crimes against humanity for his role in the 1991-1995 conflict in Croatia.

The trial against Hadzic is scheduled to open on October 16th 2012.

Clashes in Kosovo

The situation in Kosovo's Serb-dominated north remained tense but generally calm following the flare-up of violence on July 25th when a Kosovo police officer was killed in a shootout with local Serbs. The incident occurred when the government sent special police to the region to take control of two border checkpoints, in a bid to enforce an embargo on Serbian imports following failed talks on a trade liberalisation deal with Belgrade.

There were several sporadic outbursts of violence since late October, when KFOR began dismantling roadblocks erected by ethnic Serbs to prevent the Kosovo authorities from asserting control in the region, where Serb-run parallel structures continue to operate. Two German peacekeepers were shot and wounded in an incident in late November, when Serb protestors opened fire at KFOR troops. Another 23 NATO soldiers were injured during the clash.

Concerned about the possible negative impact of such violence on his country's hopes for achieving formal EU candidate status at the Union's summit on December 9th, Serbian President Boris Tadic urged Kosovo Serbs to remove the barricades. They didn't.

Welcoming Tadic's statement of November 29th, NATO called for concrete follow-up actions.

"The use of violence against KFOR is unacceptable and we deplore it," the North Atlantic Council said in a statement on December 1st. "We urge all parties to exercise restraint and co-operate fully with all international actors on the ground to ensure freedom of movement without delay," it added, calling also on Belgrade and Pristina to continue their constructive participation in the EU-mediated talks between them.

During a visit to Pristina on December 19th, German Chancellor Angela Markel urged Belgrade to dissolve the parallel Serb structures in Kosovo's north.

Earlier in the month, Serbia and Kosovo adopted an Integrated Border Management agreement, aimed at resolving the border problems between the two countries. Other deals reached during the EU-brokered talks on technical issues between Belgrade and Pristina in the latter half of 2011 include the deal on free movement and another on mutual recognition of diplomas.

Organ trafficking investigation

In December 2010, Council of Europe (CoE) rapporteur Dick Marty submitted a report linking senior Kosovo officials, including Prime Minister Hashim Thaci and other former members of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), to organ trafficking in the late 1990s. EULEX launched a preliminary investigation into the allegations in late January and seven months later, it named former US ambassador-at-large for war crimes John Clint Williamson as head of the task force dealing with the case.

While the announcement was welcomed by some Serbian officials, Belgrade continued pushing for UN involvement in the investigation. Later in the year, a draft resolution prepared by Serbian and Russian diplomats was submitted to the Security Council, envisioning the appointment of a special representative of the UN secretary-general in charge of control of the EULEX task force.

Bilateral disputes

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled on December 5th that Greece breached a 1995 interim bilateral agreement with Macedonia by blocking its northern neighbour's NATO accession in April 2008 over the long-running name dispute between the two countries.

"The ruling is a step towards NATO and EU," Macedonian Foreign Minister Nikola Poposki said after it was announced.

Later the same day, NATO issued a statement, saying the verdict "does not affect the decision taken by NATO Allies at the Bucharest summit in 2008".

"We agreed that an invitation will be extended to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia as soon as a mutually acceptable solution to the name issue has been reached," the statement of December 5th added.
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Another Balkan case before the ICJ -- on the application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide filed by Croatia back in 1999 against what was then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia -- is still pending. The hearings are not expected to start before early 2013.

Bosnia and Herzegovina politicians reach agreement

The main political parties in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) reached an agreement December 28th on the formation of a new state-level government after 14 months of futile talks following the October 2010 general elections in the country.

"It is positive news that leaders have at long last, finally reached agreement on the Council of Ministers (CoM) and other important measures; I congratulate them," High Representative Valentin Inzko said in a statement on December 29th. "I encourage the political leaders to build on this positive development. Many important challenges will lie ahead of a new CoM in the months ahead -- challenges that must be overcome in order to move this country forward in a way that will benefit the citizens."

This content was commissioned for SETimes.com.